Summary Page
I. Background to Confrontation: 2-3
The Political Situation in Early 1996.
II. Prince Ranariddh's Strategy of Provocation 3
III. The Strategy of Provocation Emerges 3-5
A. March 1996 FUNCINPEC Party Congress's Attack
on the Coalition Government.
B. Power Sharing: A Phony Issue
IV. The Strategy Unfolds 3-6
A. The Case of Prince Sirivudh
B. Creation of NUF
V. FUNCINPEC's Military Build-up and 6-8
the Use of Violence and Intimidation
A. Build-up of Armed Forces
B. Illegal Importation of Weapons
C. Use of Violence and Intimidation
VI. Prince Ranariddh's Attempt to Destabilize the 9-11
Government by Embracing the Khmer Rouge Hardliners
APPENDICES
For some, the events of 4-5 July 1997 in Phnom Penh were shocking. But for careful observers of the Cambodian political situation, they were the predictable culmination of more than a year-long build-up of tensions. These events were the natural result of a strategy adopted early in 1996 by some of the leadership of the FUNCINPEC Party, led by Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Faced with a weakening political position, they decided to embark on a dangerous policy- to adopt a campaign of provocation against its coalition partner, the Cambodian People's Party. The idea was that they could gain lost political ground by creating a crisis in which the Second Prime Minister would make a fatal mistake which then would benefit Prince Ranariddh.
As time passed, it became clear that this strategy embraced a secret military build- up by military commanders under Prince Ranariddh. While at first this may have merely been part of the policy of provocation, it later took on a life of its own. Without sanction of the Ministry of Defense, FUNCINPEC commanders moved redeployed security forces to Phnom Penh and secretly built up existing military units using Khmer Rouge elements. Prince Ranariddh himself was involved in this activity as he attempted to illegally bring in weapons and ammunition to arm these illegal troops.
In the latter stages of this strategy, Prince Ranariddh engaged in the most dangerous tactic of all he secretly and unilaterally began negotiations with the remaining Khmer Rouge hardliners at Anlong Veng. Hoping to add their military assets to the growing FUNCINPEC military forces, Prince Ranariddh was willing to deal with the last Pol Potists, who remained dedicated to the destruction of his coalition partner, the CPP. Although the FUNCINPEC leadership attempted to keep the negotiations secret, the truth quickly emerged. But whether the talks were secret or not, the outlawed Khmer Rouge rebels maintained a consistent policy continue to attack RCAF forces and urge violence against the CPP and Prime Minister Hun Sen on KR radio and in the pronouncements of its leadership. Thus, you had the unseemly action of Prince Ranariddh in trying to forge a military and political alliance with the last Khmer Rouge holdouts at the very time that those hardliners remained publicly dedicated to the destruction of one-half of the government.
This last action was tantamount to announcing that the coalition government was being terminated. The military build-up and the alliance with the Khmer Rouge were virtually a declaration of war.
Although the strategy of provocation may have evolved over time -- becoming more extreme as radicals gained supremacy inside FUNCINPEC and decided to place the entire concept of the coalition government at risk. They were willing to gamble with the stability and prosperity of the country for their own partisan ends.
The FUNCINPEC strategy of provocation finally came to logical conclusion: while the previous policy of confrontational politics could be ignored by the Second Prime Minister and his party, the secret military build-up of FUNCINPEC military units around Phnom Penh, the infiltration of Khmer Rouge elements into the city itself, and the budding alliance with the Pol Potists, dedicated to destroying Hun Sen and his party, required a response.
Faced with imminent danger, the security organs of the state began to act. In late June, police began sweeps of neighborhoods in Phnom Penh where KR infiltrators and soldiers of FUNCINPEC's Third Division illegally moved by General Nhiek Bun Chhay were suspected of being housed. The RCAF began visiting FUNCINPEC military installations and other sites to identify and disarm illegal Khmer Rouge soldiers. It was in this context that fighting erupted on 5 July 1997. It was the visit of governmental authorities to check and disarm suspected illegal troops, including Khmer Rouge soldiers, which triggered fighting as the camps under suspicion fired on the authorities.
In early 1996, FUNCINPEC faced a bad situation. Since the 1993, it had done little in the way of party building. It had not held a party congress since 1992. Few of its officials engaged in outreach to the provinces. In some areas of the country, it did not exist at all. Some of the key issues which had helped it in the 1993 election were no longer available for the 1998 elections. For example, FUNCINPEC had won many votes in 1993 because of its stand against corruption, but by 1996 was widely viewed as being far more corrupt than any other party. In addition, FUNCINPEC had sustained purges in its own ranks of some of its senior people. First, Sam Rainsy was dismissed from his ministerial post, removed from the National Assembly, and purged from FUNCINPEC party rolls. Then, in November 1995, Prince Ranariddh not only acquiesced in the arrest of Prince Sirivudh, the Secretary General of FUNCINPEC, but he denounced him for plotting to assassinate the Second Prime Minister.
Thus, in early 1996, conventional wisdom held that the CPP was sure to win the next election. As a political party, it was active in every province of the country. In 1995, the CPP and Samdech Hun Sen initiated rural development programs designed to help met the basic needs of the people. The CPP had promoted humanitarian programs to assist flood victims. It had strengthened its position in the government. In short, it was well prepared for the next election.
Knowing that he had helped to weaken his party, Prince Ranariddh, also knew that something drastic had to be done in order to bolster his party's flagging fortunes. He and some of his top advisers devised a plan that ultimately was to put all of Cambodia in danger.
Since early 1996, senior leaders of FUNCINPEC consistently followed a strategy of confrontation and provocation. The origins of the Prince Ranariddh's strategy of confrontation extend back to a meeting held in Kompong Som in January 1996. At that time, some senior FUNCINPEC party officials decided on a policy to build up its military and, at the same time, engage in confrontational politics.
But this policy should come as no surprise to any careful observer of Cambodian politics. In private, FUNCINPEC party officials admitted that, during the course of the last year, they used provocation in an attempt to prod the CPP into over-reacting and thus discredit the party. Over the past year, the officials have told this to foreign reporters and businessmen, and members of the diplomatic community.
This strategy was revealed in the foreign press. Even those newspapers that are pro-FUNCINPEC admit that the party's strategy has been one of provocation. For example, the Phnom Penh Post, a newspaper with good sources in FUNCINPEC, reported last year that a senior party official told their reporters that the FUNCINPEC had "embarked" on a deliberate campaign to antagonize Hun Sen. The aim… was to provoke Hun Sen into taking drastic action likely to draw national and international condemnation of him."
Foreign diplomats were briefed on exactly the same policy. They were explicitly told that some senior elements of FUNCINPEC intended to engage in provocative acts designed to make Samdech Hun Sen react in a harsh way. It is not known whether any of the diplomats so advised cautioned Prince Ranariddh against this strategy.
On the other hand, the Second Prime Minister, knowing about the policy of provocation, acted with restraint. Nevertheless, the events of the past year can be best understood if one understands Prince Ranariddh's strategy of provocation.
The policy of confrontation was unveiled at the FUNCINPEC party convention in March 1996, the first such congress held since 1992. At that time, Prince Ranariddh openly broke with the CPP. For the first time in three years a member of the coalition government decided to publicly attack the other.
A. March 1996 FUNCINPEC Party Congress's Attack on the Coalition Government
The March 1996 FUNCINPEC Party Congress -- the first held in four years--was a tragic turning point. For the first three years of the coalition government, the parties had a good working relationship. Although the two parties had differences of opinion regarding certain governmental policies, these were put aside for the benefit of the nation. Any disputes between the parties were worked out in private so as to assist in national reconciliation. Political stability was deemed to be so important for the economic progress and social development of the country, differences of opinion were aired only in private or put aside altogether. The experiment in democracy in Cambodia, for which the international community had done so much to support, was working remarkably well. Outside observers noted that the coalition government was functioning well beyond expectations, and the nation was moving forward on all fronts.
Unfortunately, decisions taken by some of FUNCINPEC's leadership in early 1996 destroyed the chance for continued progress. As a working partner in the coalition government and a senior representative of the CPP, Prince Ranariddh invited Samdech Hun Sen to attend the opening of the session. The Second Prime Minister did so as it reaffirmed the principle of national reconciliation embodied in the Paris Peace Agreement. Banners hung at the meeting hall hailed the coalition government. One such sign read " Long live the FUNCINPEC-CPP alliance!" This banner recognized the positive approach that both parties had taken since the beginning of the coalition government.
Unfortunately, that spirit was short lived. After Samdech Hun Sen's departure from the Congress, his coalition partner, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, chose to attack the entire concept of a coalition government. He derided the coalition government as being merely a "slogan" and compared it to an "empty bucket." Prince Ranariddh even accused the coalition government, of which he represented one-half as being a "puppet" of the Vietnamese. Threatening the very stability of the county, Prince Ranariddh speculated that FUNCINPEC might withdraw from the government, thereby creating a political crisis of the first order.
B. Power Sharing: A Phony Issue
And what was the basic of his challenged to create a political crisis? It was that the CPP had refused to share power with FUNCINPEC at lower levels of the government. Prince Ranariddh's assumption that FUNCINPEC must be awarded positions at the lower levels of government surely could not be based on the 1993 Paris Peace Agreement. Nowhere in that document did it state that any faction could appoint governmental workers.
Prince Ranariddh's assumption also could not be based on standard practice in multi-party, democratic political systems. In any modern democracy, the ranks of the civil servants remain untouched by the results of elections. Whether one examines France, the United States, Australia or any other democracy, when political leadership changes through an election, only the top political positions change. Therefore, the Ministers, the Secretaries of State, and the Undersecretaries of State might change, but the civil servants remain.
Nevertheless, in the spirit of reconciliation, the CPP had already agreed to integrate more than 11,000 persons from FUNCINPEC and more than 7,000 from the BLDP into the government ranks. Furthermore, among the police cadre, more than 15,000 FUNCINPEC and more than 4,000 BLDP personnel were taken in. In the framework at that time, the CPP, as a coalition partner, was prepared to accept FUNCINPEC personnel at the district level. However, Prince Ranariddh was never able to provide a list of the people who were to assume positions at the local levels.
The leader of the FUNCINPEC party, seizing upon this phony issue, threatened to withdraw from the government. This was an attempt to manipulate public opinion and create political instability. If FUNCINPEC was to withdraw from the government, it would force a general election before schedule and before there was a law or election apparatus in place. In other words, it would cause chaos.
In the face of this challenge, the CPP declared that it had to defend the continuity of the National Assembly and Royal Government as well as the Constitution.
Thus, Prince Ranariddh's angry outburst at the March 1996 party congress was unwarranted in its assumptions, but was devastating in its implications. His unprecedented attack on the concept of the coalition government and his threat to destabilize the country by withdrawing from the government changed the course of Cambodian history for the worse.
Although Prince Ranariddh's tirade at the March 1996 Party Congress was incorrect and petulant, it was not made without premeditation. Prince Ranariddh know what he was doing, and why. It was the beginning of a campaign to destabilize the country by engaging in a policy of confrontation and provocation. This is a deliberate policy to undermine the political, governmental and social order of the nation.
A. The Case of Prince Sirivudh
Among the various devices employed by Prince Ranariddh to provoke the Second Prime Minister and create chaos in Cambodia was the threatened return to Cambodia of Prince Norodom Sirivudh. Over the past year, senior leaders of FUNCINPEC used Prince Sirivudh as a means of creating a crisis atmosphere in Phnom Penh, Sirivudh, who was arrested and convicted for plotting to assassinate the Second Prime Minister, had been in exile. During the latter part of 1996 and again in April 1997, some leaders of FUNCINPEC orchestrated a crisis atmosphere by threatening or attempting to have the prince return to Cambodia.
During the past year, Samdech Hun Sen's position has been clear. Prince Sirivudh could return to Cambodia only if he first received a Royal pardon. Otherwise, because Prince Sirivudh had already been convicted, he would be arrested at the airport and taken to jail. To date, the King will not issue a pardon.
In all of this, Prince Ranariddh has played a double game aimed at heightening tensions and provoking the Second Prime Minister. At the time that Sirivudh was arrested, Prince Ranariddh was fully in favor of the arrest Rather than defending him, Prince Ranariddh denounced Prince Sirivudh, who played an incriminating tape recording of the prince discussing his plan to kill the Second Prime Minister to the diplomatic corps.
One year later, however, Prince Ranariddh was supporting the return of Prince Sirivudh even stating that he would dispatch troops to the airport to ensure his safe return. The threat to bring Prince Sirivudh back in the latter part of 1996 and the attempt to have him return in April 1997 were calculated to create confrontation and crisis in Cambodia. Whether they were successful in returning Prince Sirivudh to Cambodia or not, Prince Ranariddh would achieve his goal. If Prince Sirivudh was able to return then a crisis would have been created because it had already been announced that he will go to jail. There could be a military clash at the airport, but at the very least there would be an ongoing political confrontation over his jailing. And if Sirivudh was not successful in returning to Cambodia, he still would be capable of making repeated attempts to enter the country, which would lend itself to the crisis atmosphere.
B. Creation of UNF
As part of its effort to shore up its declining stature as a party, and as a continuation of its attack on the concept of a coalition government, in 1997 FUNCINPEC launched a new political alliance, known as the National United Front (NUF). This effort was part of an effort to bring together purged elements of FUNCINPEC plus other minor parties as part of an anti-CPP coalition. Although it was borne out of the inherent weakness of FUNCINPEC, it also served as proof that Prince Ranariddh had no new ideas, for this new coalition is really an attempt to recreate the old alliance of the 1980s during the war along the border.
In this strange alignment, Prince Ranariddh made peace with his old nemesis, Sam Rainsy. The former Finance Minister, who likes to pose as someone with high principles and without the taint of corruption, made an unusual partner for Prince Ranariddh. Forgotten are the vicious attacks on both Prince Ranariddh and FUNCINPEC when Rainsy was unceremoniously stripped of his position in the Royal Government, his Nation Assembly seat, and membership in FUNCINPEC. Once he was booted out of the government ant party. Sam Rainsy suddenly discovered corruption on the part of FUNCINPEC and its officials. While a member of the Royal Government, Sam Rainsy had been a severe critic of the CPP. However, once spurned by his former party, Sam Rainsy made significant revelations about FUNCINPEC corruption.
It is sign of real weakness and desperation that these enemies -- Prince Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy -- have now entered into a marriage of convenience. But an alliance with Sam Rainsy did two things for Prince Ranariddh: (1) it added some political strength to his anti-CPP political coalition and (2) given Sam Rainsy's past history of attacks on the CPP, it was sure to antagonize Prince Ranariddh's partner in the government. Thus, it remains a great curiosity that some members of FUNCINPEC, a member of the ruling coalition government, felt compelled to join with opposition parties -- against the very government of which it is part!
The outreach to the Khmer Rouge holdouts at Anlong Veng -- who were invited to join NUF -- made sense in that Prince Ranariddh was trying to reassemble the factions that were in alliance in the 1980s. In sum, although the two cases are different -- the alliance with Sam Rainsy and the attempt to legitimize the last elements of the Khmer Rouge -- both are provocations, designed to undermine the coalition and create political controversy and strife.
An essential element in Prince Ranariddh's strategy of provocation was the threat or use of violence. In 1997, this practice has increased with the use of soldiers for partisan purposes.
A. Build-up of Armed Forces
The policy to build-up their military forces was adopted at their meeting on 20 January 1996. The increase in armed personnel occurred in practically every province. As previously mentioned, the creation of new units or additions to existing ones using Khmer Rouge elements was a key part of the FUNCINPEC hardlines' strategy. Recently, more than 3,700 men were added to their roles in this way. In addition, other KR soldiers brought from the border were hidden in Phnom Penh.
An example of this build-up occurred in Dang Kor district. In January of this year, FUNCINPEC mobilized 559 personnel under the name of Division 250. In February 1997, they included 385 personnel under the name of Division 605 in Kampot. In this case, the joint commission wanted to investigate this build-up, but FUNCINPEC removed this force out of the military camp in order to hide them. Finally, as previously mentioned, Lt. Col. Phon Pheap, the KR commander, admitted to bring in more than 500 Khmer Rouge soldiers into Phnom Penh in mid-April. This was at the request of General Nhiek Bun Chhay.
In addition, FUNCINPEC units were moved from the northwest to camps in camps in or near Phnom Penh. For example, as part of the unauthorized increase in the number of troops around the capital, on 23-24 June 1997, 74 soldiers from FUNCINPEC Military Divisions 3 and 12 were arrested on their way from Battambang to Phnom Penh. The soldiers, who were dressed in civilian clothes, were moving under orders from FUNCINPEC. Their transfer was not authorized by the Military Regional Commander or by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, as required.
In another case of an illegal troop movement, a letter was discovered from the bead of the Banteay Meanchey office of FUNCINPEC to General Nhiek Bun Chhay. The letter stated that the following soldiers were being sent from Banteay Meanchey to Kompong Speu province (close to Phnom Penh): 150 soldiers from Division 12, 40 Military Police, 200 Provincial Police, and 200 Khmer Rouge defectors. Again, this movement of troops was not authorized as required by the Chief of the General Staff. But if it clearly was part of the secret military build-up by FUNCINPEC.
In addition, in order to garrison these illegal troops, illegal barracks were established. For example, at Wat Phneat in Ans Nul district of Kompong Speu, an illegal barracks was established for Khmer Rouge soldiers. This barracks was established without the authorization of the Ministry of Defense, and was one of the objects of the search which led to fighting on 5 July 1997.
Thus, there were several key issues concerning the FUNCINPEC military build-up. First was the unauthorized expansion and redeployment of FUNCINPEC security forces to Phnom Penh. Second, there was the establishment of illegal garrisons around the capital. Third there was the deployment of Khmer Rouge soldiers from the northwest to Phnom Penh, intended to both be integrated into existing FUNCINPEC units and to infiltrate the city. The importance of the miniaturization of the Khmer Rouge and their introduction to Phnom Penh by Prince Ranariddh's military advisers cannot be minimized. For the first time since 1978, armed Khmer Rouge soldiers were present in the streets of Phnom Penh.
B. illegal Importation of Weapons
Of course, it is one thing to secretly build-up the personnel in your army. It is another thing to arm them. For the Khmer Rouge defectors, many would bring weapons with them. For other, FUNCINPEC could use the arsenal of RCAF. But more weapons and ammunition would be needed, and Prince Ranariddh was faced with a serious question: where could he get the guns to arm his secret divisions?
Prince Ranariddh thought he had the perfect answer, he would use his name and the prestige of his high office to illegally import weapons. Since no one was to know about the build-up of FUNCINPEC soldiers, no one would know about the weapons they would use either. So on 2 May 1997; Samdech Krom Preah Norodom Ranariddh sent a letter to the Director of the Port in Sihanoukville to release a container which Prince Ranariddh claimed were "spare parts." The same letter was sent to the Commander of his personal bodyguard unit to collect the container. The bill of lading also clearly indicated that the container was intended for Prince Ranariddh and that its contents were "spare parts."
The whole world knows what happened next. On 26 May, government officials inspected the container and found weapons and ammunition instead of spare parts, as previously claimed by Prince Ranariddh. Nearly three tons of weapons included rockets, AK-47 assault rifles, hand guns, ammunition, and other armaments.
When this illegal shipment of weapons was exposed the only explanation offered by Prince Ranariddh and his men was that it was legal for a prime minister to bring weapons into the country. But if it was legal for him to do so, why did he hide them? If bringing weapons into Cambodia is a normal activity, why did he lie about the shipment of arms?
C. Use of Violence and Intimidation
With the objective of confronting the CPP and destabilizing the country, a campaign of violence and intimidation has occurred over the past year. For example, starting in November 1996 and continuing into the new year, there were increasing tensions and armed clashes in Battambang. This confrontation was fuelled by radical rhetoric and actions of then Deputy Governor, Serey Kosal. In December 1996, despite the fact that he had no legal authority over RCAF troops, Serey Kosal ordered FUNCINPEC-aligned soldiers to move into position in Battambang province. In an apparent secessionist move, he threatened to cut off the province from the capital and challenged the Second Prime Minister to do something about it. He even moved troops as far south as Pursat province. His troops included not only FUNCINPEC-aligned soldiers but also Khmer Rouge defectors. This warlike position led to clashes between FUNCINPEC soldiers along with Khmer Rouge against regular RCAF soldiers. When fighting erupted in February of this year, instead of being demoted, Serey Kosal was promoted to be Prince Ranariddh's national security adviser.
The promotion of extremist elements within FUNCINPEC also is indicative of the implementation of the policy of provocation. Over the course of the past year, Prince Ranariddh promoted hardliners such as Serey Kosal and General Nhiek Bun Chhay.
Regrettably, Prince Ranariddh himself engaged in extreme theatric, which has further fuelled the flames of violence on the part of certain elements of FUNCINPEC. Several months ago, when a Phnom Penh television station refused to play a tape that he wanted played on the air, Prince Ranariddh threatened to send a tank to the television station to ensure that the tape was played.
This lesson was not lost on extremists in FUNCINPEC. Later, when a state-owned television station in Kompong Som refused to broadcast a tape of Serey Kosal, the station was attacked by soldiers with assault rifles and rockets. This attack was an attack on freedom of the press, and resulted in the deaths and injury of many people.
The linkage between Prince Ranariddh's statements and violence apparently is not coincidental. A monument in Kompong Som was bombed with the approval and perhaps encouragement of the Prince. Even the King denounced Prince Ranariddh's position on the bombing of monuments. Prince Ranariddh's father thought his words to be ill-advised, stating that they raised a politically sensitive issue at a bad time for Cambodia.
More recently, on 17 June 1997, the world was shocked when fighting broke out in front of the house of the Chief of the National Police. Bodyguard elements from the First Prime Minister attacked the policemen guarding the house of Gen. Hok Lundy. Although FUNCINPEC security chief Serey Kosal later disputed the events of that evening, the Western and Cambodian media correctly reported that the fighting occurred at the residence of the Police Chief.
The subject of provocation cannot be left without mention of the 30 March grenade attack Some people have accused the bodyguards of the Second Prime Minister for this action, a charge which they vehemently deny. But consider the question that was asked at the time: who benefited from the attack? Given the year long campaign to destabilize Cambodia, one could assume that other parties would have a greater interest in such a terrorist action.
The most striking example of Prince Ranariddh's strategy of provocation is its recent negotiations with the hardliners of the Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng. Prince Ranariddh's desire to align himself with the Pol Potists should not be mystifying because he was in alliance with the Khmer Rouge for a long time. As part of the old alliance, certain elements of FUNCINPEC have always been comfortable working with the DK. In 1997, as a further attempt to undermine the coalition government with the CPP and to increase political tensions, FUNCINPEC attempted to make secret deals with the Khmer Rouge. Royalist negotiators were working to find a way so that KR hardliners could emerge as legitimate members of the political scene in Cambodia. It was a very simple deal. The Khmer Rouge leadership was looking for legitimacy. Prince Ranariddh was looking for the military support that these recalcitrants could bring. He was willing to overlook the past history of genocide and war and make an alliance with the holdouts in Anlong Veng.
The secret negotiations were ridden with disaster from the beginning Prince Ranariddh sent a helicopter full of negotiators to their certain death in an attempt to reach out to the criminals hiding in Anlong Veng.
Although the agents of Prince Ranariddh first made contact with the rebel forces as early as February, the Prince did not admit the contact until 4 March 1997. As part of his outreach to Anlong Veng, he sent a copy of his 14-point political program of the National United Front to the notorious KR commander, Ta Mok. On 21 March, Khieu Samphan publicly supported the 14 points of the United Front on KR radio.
The real intentions of the FUNCINPEC-Khmer Rouge alliance became known on 24 June 1997 when Lt. Col. Phon Pheap, Commander of a DK division, was brought to Phnom Penh by FUNCINPEC General Nhiek Bun Chhay. The KR commander was supposed to form a special unit to attack the CPP. Phon Pheap has publicly announced that the KR in Along Veng have negotiated a deal so that he can bring a Khmer Rouge force to Phnom Penh in order to fight the CPP and take power. These revelations forced the government reconciliation team to announce on 25 June 1997 that it was going to investigate the KR force that was to be brought to Phnom Penh in an illegal manner by General Nhiek Bun Chhay.
It is remarkable that these secret negotiations, including a trip by Prince Ranariddh through Thailand to the Cambodian border which he first denied and later admitted -- occurred at a time when the hardline elements of the Khmer Rouge continued to attack the government's armed forces on the battlefield and make vitriolic attacks on Prince Ranariddh's coalition partner daily on Khmer Rouge radio. The attempt to bring these hardline communists into the political arena in Phnom Penh was both an attempt to strengthen FUNCINPEC by finding any allies whatsoever, regardless of origins, and a direct attack on the CPP. The attempt to bring of the worst elements of the Khmer Rouge into the legitimate political arena is both against the law banning the illegal organization but a direct challenge to the entire concept of the coalition government.
Of course, some senior officials in FUNCINPEC tried to deflect the criticism by stating that these were not the hardline elements. But how many times does the Khmer Rouge have to trot out Khieu Samphan as an example of the moderates in the Khmer Rouge when in fact he has always been willing to play the role of the front man for Pol Pot, Ta Mok and the rest. Many times over the years the Khmer Rouge have announced that Pol Pot is "retired," Pol Pot is dead; Pol Pot is no longer in Cambodia, etc. It really does not make any difference -- the gang that remain in the jungle at Anlong Veng represent the worst element of the Khmer Rouge and are responsible for the deaths of millions, regardless of whether Khieu Samphan is their nominal leader or not.
Another means by which Prince Ranariddh attempted to give legitimacy to his negotiations with the Pol Potists was by citing Samdech Hun Sen's opening to Ieng Sary in 1996. But the circumstances were completely different. First, the break of the Khmer Rouge in the northwest was the first substantial split inside the communists. In order to further the dissolution of the Khmer Rouge, every effort had to be made to break that important faction away from the main organization. Second, there was a unified government policy at the time to encourage those defections in the northwest. Third, the Khmer Rouge elements at Pailin, Samlot and elsewhere unconditionally left the hardliners, pledged their allegiance to the central government, and actually engaged in armed clashes with their former colleagues.
None of the above elements exist with regard to the negotiations held with the rebels at Anlong Veng. The small group of Khmer Rouge still holding out represent no threat to Cambodia so long as the coalition government remained unified. There was no imperative to deal with them as they represent the last remnants of the former communist organization. Also, unlike the situation in Battambang, there was no unified government policy toward these Khmer Rouge, nor could there be so long as they continued to attack the RCAF and call for violence against the CPP and its leadership.
This is no mere side issue. The secret negotiations between the Khmer Rouge and elements of FUNCINPEC struck at the heart of the coalition government. To contemplate bringing in these elements at a time when they continued to attack the Royal Government's force on the battlefield was unbelievable. But it is equally unbelievable that Prince Ranariddh is willing to jeopardize the stability of the government in trying to bring these radicals who are dedicated to destroy the CPP into his alliance.
Five and one-half years ago, the various factions signed a peace accord in Paris. It was dedicated to national reconciliation. At that time, for the sake of peace, all parties were willing to overlook the past excesses and cruelties of one of the factions, the Khmer Rouge, in order to bring about the goal of national reconciliation. Unfortunately, after signing the agreement, the Khmer Rouge decided not to rejoin the national community but instead embarked on a course of military adventurism and terror, which they have continued into 1997. The other factions submitted themselves to administration by the United Nations Transitional Authority, engaged in the elections, and subsequently formed a government based on national reconciliation.
Now, over five years later, one faction in the government wants to make a deal with the Khmer Rouge outlaws. Prince Ranariddh wants to ally itself with the Pol Potists. It could not be for the sake of national reconciliation because the hardliners remaining at Anlong Veng have never accepted the principle of national reconciliation. The military or political arrival of the Khmer Rouge in Phnom Penh would not enhance the stability of the government: the daily calls for violence against on the CPP and me on DK radio means that the Khmer Rouge is not interested in strengthening the government but further dividing it and the nation.
Given the recent Khmer Rouge infiltration into Phnom Penh and FUNCINPEC military bases can only mean one thing that the secret negotiations with the Khmer Rouge are part of Prince Ranariddh's plan to further destabilize the government by bringing into the legitimate political arena the one faction absolutely opposed to national reconciliation and use the KR military assets as part of a larger strategy to seize power in Cambodia. Elements of FUNCINPEC, led by Prince Ranariddh, were trying to make a deal with the one faction that rejected national reconciliation in the past and continues to reject it.
Finally, there was a serious question posed about the legality of Prince Ranariddh's negotiations with the Khmer Rouge. In 1994, the National Assembly outlawed the Khmer Rouge. Any negotiations since that time were only conducted with the knowledge, participation, and authority of the co-prime ministers. Now, one part of the government has engaged in talks with the one element of the KR that has rejected reform, rejected reconciliation.
Prince Ranariddh's actions-both the attempt to make legitimate the Khmer Rouge hardliners and use their forces to secretly infiltrate the armed forces and the capital of Phnom Penh-struck at the very heart of the idea of a coalition government.